

and the remainder divided between the army, navy, and marines. Even as the Vietnam War expanded, U.S. force levels in Japan continued to decline.

By the mid-1960s, the United States all but abandoned its effort to promote large-scale Japanese rearmament. The self-defense forces totaled around 250,000 throughout the decade. In place of size, the Defense Department pressed Japan to improve the quality of its air and maritime forces. As a result, Japan's military evolved into an efficient defense force with little offensive capability.

The repair, communication, ammunition and fuel storage, and recreational facilities the U.S. military retained in Japan were critical components of Asian defense strategy. These installations, along with those in Okinawa, Guam, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, formed a coordinated network east of Hawaii. Bases on Okinawa were especially vital to the air war in Vietnam. One million military transport and combat flights originated in the Ryukyus between 1965 and 1973. KC 135 tanker planes refueled B 52 bombers flying from Guam to Indochina, and the B-52s sometimes flew directly from the Ryukyus. Unrestricted by the 1960 security treaty, American forces stored chemical and nuclear weapons on Okinawa. Nearly three fourths of the 400,000 tons of supplies required each month by American troops in Vietnam passed

through Japan. In December of that year, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, commander of Pacific forces, declared that "without Okinawa we couldn't continue to fight the Vietnam War."

The loss of Okinawa would have been a disaster for the United States in the Pacific.

Japan's fleet of ships, including aircraft carriers, was the largest in the world. The fleet was based on the West Coast for maintenance and repair. In many cases, the fleet was home for months at a time. The fleet's presence in Japan was a constant reminder of the United States' military power in the Pacific. The fleet's presence in Japan was also a constant reminder of the United States' military power in the Pacific.

Although the security treaty barred the United States from introducing nuclear weapons to Japan without permission, the secret protocol of 1960 permitted nuclear-armed planes and ships to "transit" through the country. American war plans and informal procedures followed by local commanders stretched this loophole even further. Air force transport planes stationed on Pacific islands were assigned, in case of a war alert, to transport

nuclear weapons to U.S. air bases in Japan without obtaining Tokyo's approval. The weapons would then be deployed against targets in North-east Asia.³⁷

While visiting Japan in the early 1960s as a Rand Corporation analyst working on a Pentagon study, Daniel Ellsberg uncovered a more serious violation of the security treaty. The small marine air base at Iwakuni, on the Inland Sea, had a handful of planes assigned to attack some two dozen targets in North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. The marines arranged with local navy officials to store nuclear bombs on an LST barge (the "San Joaquin County") semi-permanently moored a few hundred yards offshore. If needed, the motorized barge would approach the beach and send its bombs ashore on amphibious tractors directly to the marine airfield. Neither civilian nor military commanders in Washington seemed aware of this. Navy records, Ellsberg discovered, listed the LST as docked in Okinawa. The arrangement was "regarded as super-secret from the Japanese" and from civilians in the Pentagon.

The barge's vulnerability to sabotage and the high risk of public disclosure of its cargo prompted Ellsberg to minimize the violation as he learned. Exposure of the barge to the Japanese government would have a rupture in diplomatic relations, driven drive Japan to

Paul Nitze and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara as if it was a totally irresponsible action it was possible to imagine pressed the navy to fix the problem, top admirals denied

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By this time, Reischauer found it nearly impossible to defend the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had been elected by their opposition to a Vietnam policy. He had been elected by their opposition to a Vietnam policy. He had been elected by their opposition to a Vietnam policy.

Johnson met with Reischauer for an hour on July 22. The ambassador hoped to speak about the damage America's China and Vietnam policies

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Despite these trends, neither grassroots nor elite opposition to the war ever threatened Sato's domination of the LDP or the party's monopoly of power. The anti-war movement failed to arouse the depth of passion that the anti-security treaty movement had in 1960. Many Japanese opposed the war, but still voted for the LDP.

The structure of Japanese politics and the LDP further mitigated the impact of the anti-war movement. Prime ministers were chosen by Diet members, not voters. LDP faction leaders controlled blocs of Diet members in the bargaining process that resulted in selection of a party leader/prime minister. Party barons and their followers forged and broke alliances to gain control of cabinet posts, patronage, and rewards for constituents and campaign donors. Whenever possible, they avoided embracing popular causes or grappling with divisive issues. The Vietnam War was not so overwhelming a concern among voters as to force the LDP to take heed of anti-war sentiment or risk losing its Diet majority.

1 Vietnam occupied the entire state's press about 90 percent of the country's
subsidies to sympathetic newspapers and magazines and to influential
members of the Democratic Socialist and Liberal Democratic parties.
The press made a concerted effort to influence the military and political
opposition to the United States for Vietnam's independence.

The report also does not spend the time on a known, but still existing, problem with military officials: they are often focused on a narrow, short-term, tactical view of the situation in Cuba, as a U.S. ally, rather than the broader, long-term, strategic view that served as the primary content of American anti-Cuban policy. The first objection was that there both is a need for a more professional military in the Army, and Mr. Steadman agreed that it is a goal of the USA to have a more professional military. The second objection was that the USA is caught with its hand in the cookie jar. There will be some military cooperation, but not too much.

...ion surveys during 1965 to 1968 found a sizeable
ity of Japanese opposed to U.S. intervention in Vietnam and expanding the
nd war. Respondents agreed with the Viet Cong goal of top-
pling the Saigon regime. At the height of American escalation,
two-thirds of Japanese polled favored adopting a more neutral foreign

In 1952, over 200,000 American military personnel remained on 70,000 bases and installations in Japan. These numbers shrank during the next decade. By 1964 (excluding facilities and personnel for 45,000 military dependents, and the sailors of the Japan Base Fleet), the United States maintained in Japan twelve major base facilities, and 46,000 military personnel. Half of them were

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were doing throughout Asia. But Johnson delivered a harangue about anti-war senators who undermined his policies. Dispirited, Reischauer left the White House and ventured to the Senate where he shared his doubts with Senate Majority Leader Fulbright and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee. A few days later, the State Department announced his resignation. The selection of career diplomat U. Alexis Johnson as ambassador to Tokyo.⁴⁰

The war dogged Reischauer's final days in Tokyo. At farewell receptions he attended, "groups of vociferous young Americans and Japanese" stood at the entrance to the buildings "shouting protests against America's Vietnam policies." At one event the protestors even included "an acquaintance," Professor Howard Zinn of Boston University. Reischauer could "never forget him wildly beating on a drum in an effort to spoil the party given in Haru's honor."⁴¹

Japan and the Economic Dimensions of the Vietnam War

MITI officials minimized Vietnam's impact by comparing war orders to total GNP. They noted that Korean-era procurement totaled about \$5.8 billion in an economy only a sixth as large as that of Japan.

expansion rapidly as the remnant produced Vietnam-related materials. Japan and surrounding countries. Military orders encouraged technological transfer and innovation. With American industry producing at full capacity, ever higher levels of Japanese exports found a permanent niche in the U.S. consumer market. The expenditure of billions of war-related dollars in Japan, Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and

MITI's dilemma in calculating the war's economic impact upon Japan. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry had the best data, but issued the more conservative analyses in order to dampen charges of war profiteering. Treasury officials used numbers close to the mid-range estimates of the Japanese Finance Ministry and private banks. All calculations came on top of the \$340 million "base" level of U.S. procurements in Japan in 1964. They also accounted for the fact that exports to the United States and Southeast Asia were on an upward curve when escalation began.

MITI data for 1965 to 1972 indicates that Japan earned at least \$7 billion in "extra" sales of goods and services related to Vietnam. This included \$1.77 billion in direct procurement by U.S. forces in Japan, \$2.83 billion in indirect procurement by Vietnam and countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines; and almost \$2 billion in indirect procurement in terms of additional exports to the United States made possible by the war. Japan earned at least \$1 billion per year and possibly as much as \$1.5 billion from the Vietnam War.⁴²

MITI Estimates of Japan's Earnings from Vietnam War, 1965-72 (in U.S. dollars on top of 1964 base of \$340 million)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Direct procurement	6	134	188	251	303	323	28	285
Exports to U.S.		55	246	369	438	371	256	162
Indirect procurement by Asian nations	77	256	392	444	517	404	400	400
Totals	83	445	826	1,064	1,258	1,098	937	547

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Although Japanese industry refrained from selling weapons or munitions for use in Vietnam, petrochemical companies enjoyed a brisk trade in precursor chemicals used to manufacture napalm, TNT, and other explosives. In the late 1960s, these sales totaled between \$150 and \$300 million per year. Electronic manufacturers, such as Sony, built no weapons but sold the APA guidance systems used in military aircraft, missiles, and bombs. MITI deleted many of these sales from its procurement calculations, claiming that it lacked detailed knowledge about the total value of end material sold privately to the U.S. military.⁴³

Japan accrued another benefit from recreational (R&R) spending by Americans. Between 1966 and 1969, about 50,000 military personnel stationed in Southeast Asia visited Japan annually. Hotels and travel agencies bid for contracts to serve the troops brought in on air charter flights. Hotels provided a billet, loaned the soldiers civilian clothes, and arranged for their entertainment, somewhat as had been done during the early Occupation. Each servicemen spent about \$100 per day, earning Japan a minimum of \$25 million a year.⁴⁴

NOTES TO PAGES 193-202

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